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Abstract 
 
Many millions of people hold conspiracy theories; they believe that powerful 
people have worked together in order to withhold the truth about some important 
practice or some terrible event. A recent example is the belief, widespread in some parts 
of the world, that the attacks of 9/11 were carried out not by Al Qaeda, but by Israel or 
the United States. Those who subscribe to conspiracy theories may create serious risks, 
including risks of violence, and the existence of such theories raises significant 
challenges for policy and law. The first challenge is to understand the mechanisms by 
which conspiracy theories prosper; the second challenge is to understand how such 
theories might be undermined. Such theories typically spread as a result of identifiable 
cognitive blunders, operating in conjunction with informational and reputational 
influences. A distinctive feature of conspiracy theories is their self-sealing quality. 
Conspiracy theorists are not likely to be persuaded by an attempt to dispel their theories; 
they may even characterize that very attempt as further proof of the conspiracy. Because 
those who hold conspiracy theories typically suffer from a “crippled epistemology,” in 
accordance with which it is rational to hold such theories, the best response consists in 
cognitive infiltration of extremist groups. Various policy dilemmas, such as the question 
whether it is better for government to rebut conspiracy theories or to ignore them, are 
explored in this light. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 “The truth is out there”:1 conspiracy theories are all around us.  In August 2004, a 
poll by Zogby International showed that 49 percent of New York City residents, with a 
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** Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  Thanks to Mark Tushnet for helpful conversations, to Eric 
Posner and Andrei Shleifer for valuable comments, and to Elisabeth Theodore for excellent research 
assistance. 
1 This slogan was popularized by the television show The X-Files, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_X-
Files.  9/11 conspiracy theorists often call themselves the 9/11 Truth Movement.  See The 9/11 Truth 
Movement, http://www.911truth.org (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).  
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margin of error of 3.5 percent, believed that officials of the U.S. government “knew in 
advance that attacks were planned on or around September 11, 2001, and that they 
consciously failed to act.”2  In a Scripps-Howard Poll in 2006, with an error margin of 4 
percent, some 36 percent of respondents assented to the claim that “federal officials either 
participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center or took no action to stop them.”3  
Sixteen percent said that it was either very likely or somewhat likely that “the collapse of 
the twin towers in New York was aided by explosives secretly planted in the two 
buildings.”4
Conspiracy theories are by no means a strictly domestic phenomenon; they can 
easily be found all over the world.  Among sober-minded Canadians, a September 2006 
poll found that 22 percent believe that “the attacks on the United States on September 11, 
2001 had nothing to do with Osama Bin Laden and were actually a plot by influential 
Americans.”5  In a poll conducted in seven Muslim countries, 78 percent of respondents 
said that they do not believe the 9/11 attacks were carried out by Arabs.6 The most 
popular account, in these countries, is that 9/11 was the work of the U.S. or Israeli 
governments.7
What causes such theories to arise and spread?  Are they important and perhaps 
even threatening, or merely trivial and even amusing?  What can and should government 
do about them?  We aim here to sketch some psychological and social mechanisms that 
produce, sustain, and spread these theories; to show that some of them are quite important 
and should be taken seriously; and to offer suggestions for governmental responses, both 
as a matter of policy and as a matter of law.   
The academic literature on conspiracy theories is thin, and most of it falls into one 
of two classes: (1) work by analytic philosophers, especially in epistemology and the 
philosophy of science, that asks what counts as a “conspiracy theory” and whether such 
theories are methodologically suspect;8 (2) a smattering of work in sociology and 
Freudian psychology on the causes of conspiracy theorizing.9  Both approaches have 
proved illuminating, but neither is entirely adequate, the former because the conceptual 
questions are both less tractable and less interesting than the social and institutional ones, 
the latter because it neglects newer work in social psychology and behavioral economics, 
both of which shed light on the causes of conspiracy theorizing.  Rather than engaging 
                                                 
2 Zogby International, Half of New Yorkers Believe US Leaders Had Foreknowledge of Impending 9-11 
Attacks and “Consciously Failed” To Act, Aug. 30, 2004, http://zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=855.  
3 Thomas Hargrove & Guido H. Stempel III, A Third of U.S. Public Believes 9/11 Conspiracy Theory, 
SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 2, 2006, 
http://www.shns.com/shns/g_index2.cfm?action=detail&pk=CONSPIRACY-08-02-06.  
4 Id.  
5 One in 5 Canadians Sees 9/11 as U.S. Plot – Poll, REUTERS, Sept. 11, 2006. 
6 Matthew A. Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim 
World, 18 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 117, 117 (2004)  
7 Id. at 120. 
8 See, e.g., CONSPIRACY THEORIES: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE (David Coady ed., 2006); CHANGING 
CONCEPTIONS OF CONSPIRACY (Carl F. Graumann & Serge Moscovici eds., 1988). 
9 There is also a body of work that collects many interesting examples of conspiracy theories, but without 
any sustained analytic approach.  See, e.g., Michael Barkun, A CULTURE OF CONSPIRACY (2003); Daniel 
Pipes, CONSPIRACY (1997).  For a treatment of conspiracy theories from the standpoint of cultural studies, 
see Mark Fenster, CONSPIRACY THEORIES (1999). 
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with the conceptual debates, we will proceed in an eclectic fashion and mostly from the 
ground up, hewing close to real examples and the policy problems they pose.   
Our main though far from exclusive focus – our running example – involves 
conspiracy theories relating to terrorism, especially theories that arise from and post-date 
the 9/11 attacks.  These theories exist within the United States and, even more virulently, 
in foreign countries, especially Muslim countries.  The existence of both domestic and 
foreign conspiracy theories, we suggest, is no trivial matter, posing real risks to the 
government’s antiterrorism policies, whatever the latter may be.  Terrorism-related 
theories are thus a crucial testing ground for the significance, causes, and policy 
implications of widespread conspiracy theorizing.  As we shall see, an understanding of 
conspiracy theories has broad implications for the spread of information and beliefs; 
many erroneous judgments are a product of the same forces that produce conspiracy 
theories, and if we are able to see how to counteract such theories, we will have some 
clues about how to correct widespread errors more generally.      
 Part I explores some definitional issues and lays out some of the mechanisms that 
produce conspiracy theories and theorists. We begin by discussing different 
understandings of the nature of conspiracy theories and different accounts of the kinds of 
errors made by those who hold them. Our primary claim is that conspiracy theories 
typically stem not from irrationality or mental illness of any kind but from a “crippled 
epistemology,” in the form of a sharply limited number of (relevant) informational 
sources. Those who hold conspiracy theories do so because of what they read and hear. In 
that sense, acceptance of such theories is not irrational from the standpoint of those who 
adhere to them. There is a close connection, we suggest, between our claim on this count 
and the empirical association between terrorist behavior and an absence of civil rights 
and civil liberties.10 When civil rights and civil liberties are absent, people lack multiple 
information sources, and they are more likely to accept conspiracy theories.  
 Part II discusses government responses and legal issues, in light of the discussion 
in Part I.  We address several dilemmas of governmental response to conspiracy theories, 
such as the question whether it is better to rebut such theories, at the risk of legitimating 
them, or to ignore them, at the risk of leaving them unrebutted. Conspiracy  theories turn 
out to be especially hard to undermine or dislodge; they have a self-sealing quality, 
rendering them particularly immune to challenge. We suggest several policy responses 
that can dampen the supply of conspiracy theorizing, in part by introducing diverse 
viewpoints and new factual assumptions into the hard-core groups that produce such 
theories. Our principal claim here involves the potential value of cognitive infiltration of 
extremist groups, designed to introduce informational diversity into such groups and to 
expose indefensible conspiracy theories as such. 
 
I. Definitions and Mechanisms 
                                                 
10 See Alan Krueger, WHAT MAKES A TERRORIST? 75-82 (2007).  Krueger believes that low civil liberties 
cause terrorism, but acknowledges that his data are also consistent with the hypothesis that terrorism causes 
governments to reduce civil liberties.  See id. at 148.  Of course, the two effects may both occur, in a 
mutually reinforcing pattern.  Following Krueger, we assume that low civil liberties tend to produce 
terrorism, a hypothesis that is supported by the mechanisms we adduce.   
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A. Definitional Notes 
There has been much discussion of what, exactly, counts as a conspiracy theory, 
and about what, if anything, is wrong with those who hold one.11 Of course it would be 
valuable to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for such theories, in a way that 
would make it possible to make relevant distinctions. We bracket the most difficult 
questions here and suggest more intuitively that a conspiracy theory can generally be 
counted as such if it is an effort to explain some event or practice by reference to the 
machinations of powerful people, who have also managed to conceal their role. This 
account seems to capture the essence of the most prominent and influential conspiracy 
theories. Consider, for example, the view that the Central Intelligence Agency was 
responsible for the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; that doctors deliberately 
manufactured the AIDS virus; that the 1996 crash of TWA flight 800 was caused by a 
U.S. military missile; that the theory of global warming is a deliberate fraud; that the 
Trilateral Commission is responsible for important movements of the international 
economy; that Martin Luther King, Jr., was killed by federal agents; that the plane crash 
that killed Democrat Paul Wellstone was engineered by Republican politicians; that the 
moon landing was staged and never actually occurred.12  
Of course some conspiracy theories, under our definition, have turned out to be 
true. The Watergate hotel room used by Democratic National Committee was, in fact, 
bugged by Republican officials, operating at the behest of the White House. In the 1950s, 
the Central Intelligence Agency did, in fact, administer LSD and related drugs under 
Project MKULTRA, in an effort to investigate the possibility of “mind control.” 
Operation Northwoods, a rumored plan by the Department of Defense to simulate acts of 
terrorism and to blame them on Cuba, really was proposed by high-level officials (though 
the plan never went into effect).13 In 1947, space aliens did, in fact, land in Roswell, New 
Mexico, and the government covered it all up. (Well, maybe not.) Our focus throughout 
is on false conspiracy theories, not true ones. Our ultimate goal is to explore how public 
                                                 
11 See note 8 supra. 
12 See Mark Lane, PLAUSIBLE DENIAL: WAS THE CIA INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF JFK? (1991) 
(arguing that it was); Alan Cantwell, AIDS AND THE DOCTORS OF DEATH: AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS 
OF THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1988) (suggesting AIDS was the product of a biowarfare program targeting gay 
people); Don Phillips, Missile Theory Haunts TWA Investigation; Despite Lack of Evidence and Officials' 
Denials, Some Insist Friendly Fire Caused Crash, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1997, at A03; 149 CONG. REC. 
S10022 (daily ed. July 28, 2003) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (“With all the hysteria, all the fear, all the 
phony science, could it be that manmade global warming is the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the 
American people? I believe it is.”); David Mills, Beware the Trilateral Commission!; The Influential World 
Panel Conspiracy Theorists Love to Hate, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1992, at H1 (describing various 
conspiracy theories about the Commission); William F. Pepper, AN ACT OF STATE: THE EXECUTION OF 
MARTIN LUTHER KING (2003) (arguing that the military, the CIA, and others within the government 
conspired to kill King); Kevin Diaz, Findings Don't Slow Conspiracy Theories on Wellstone Crash; An 
Official Investigation Has Focused on Pilot Error and Weather. Some Observers Still Have Suggested a 
Political Plot., STAR TRIBUNE (Minn.), June 3, 2003, at A1; Patty Reinert, Apollo Shrugged: Hoax Theories 
About Moon Landings Persist, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 17, 2002, at A1.    
13 See Bob Woodward & Carl Bernstein, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974); George Lardner Jr. & John 
Jacobs, Lengthy Mind-Control Research by CIA Is Detailed, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1977, at A1; 
Memorandum from L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense, 
Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba (Mar. 13, 1962), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf.  
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officials might undermine such theories, and as a general rule, true accounts should not 
be undermined. 
Within the set of false conspiracy theories, we also limit our focus to potentially 
harmful theories.  Not all false conspiracy theories are harmful; consider the false 
conspiracy theory, held by many of the younger members of our society, that a secret 
group of elves, working in a remote location under the leadership of the mysterious 
“Santa Claus,” make and distribute presents on Christmas Eve.  This theory is false, but is 
itself instilled through a widespread conspiracy of the powerful – parents – who conceal 
their role in the whole affair. (Consider too the Easter Bunny and the Tooth Fairy.)  It is 
an open question whether most conspiracy theories are equally benign; we will suggest 
that some are not benign at all.   
Under this account, conspiracy theories are a subset of the large category of false 
beliefs, and also of the somewhat smaller category of beliefs that are both false and 
harmful. Consider, for example, the beliefs that prolonged exposure to sunlight is actually 
healthy and that climate change is neither occurring nor likely to occur. These beliefs are 
(in our view) both false and dangerous, but as stated, they do not depend on, or posit, any 
kind of conspiracy theory. We shall see that the mechanisms that account for conspiracy 
theories overlap with those that account for false and dangerous beliefs of all sorts, 
including those that fuel anger and hatred.14 But as we shall also see, conspiracy theories 
have some distinctive features, above all because of their self-sealing quality; the very 
arguments that give rise to them, and account for their plausibility, make it more difficult 
for outsiders to rebut or even to question them.  
Conspiracy theories generally attribute extraordinary powers to certain agents – to 
plan, to control others, to maintain secrets, and so forth. Those who believe that those 
agents have such powers are especially unlikely to give respectful attention to debunkers, 
who may, after all, be agents or dupes of those who are responsible for the conspiracy in 
the first instance.  It is comparatively easier for government to dispel false and dangerous 
beliefs that rest, not on a self-sealing conspiracy theory, but on simple misinformation or 
on a fragile social consensus.  The simplest governmental technique for dispelling false 
(and also harmful) beliefs – providing credible public information – does not work, in 
any straightforward way, for conspiracy theories.  This extra resistance to correction 
through simple techniques is what makes conspiracy theories distinctively worrisome. 
A further question about conspiracy theories – whether true or false, harmful or 
benign – is whether they are justified.  Justification and truth are different issues; a true 
belief may be unjustified, and a justified belief may be untrue.  I may believe, correctly, 
that there are fires within the earth’s core, but if I believe that because the god Vulcan 
revealed it to me in a dream, my belief is unwarranted.  Conversely, the false belief in 
Santa Claus is justified, because children generally have good reason to believe what 
their parents tell them and follow a sensible heuristic (“if my parents say it, it is probably 
true”); when children realize that Santa is the product of a widespread conspiracy among 
parents, they have a justified and true belief that a conspiracy has been at work. 
                                                 
14 See Edward Glaeser, The Political Economy of Hatred, 120 Q. J. ECON. 45 (2005). 
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Are conspiracy theories generally unjustified?  Under what conditions?  Here 
there are competing accounts and many controversies, in epistemology and analytic 
philosophy.  We take no final stand on the most difficult questions here, in part because 
the relevant accounts need not be seen as mutually exclusive; each accounts for part of 
the terrain.  However, a brief review of the possible accounts will be useful for our later 
discussion. 
Karl Popper famously argued that conspiracy theories overlook the pervasive 
unintended consequences of political and social action; they assume that all consequences 
must have been intended by someone.15 The basic idea is that many social effects, 
including large movements in the economy, occur as a result of the acts and omissions of 
many people, none of whom intended to cause those effects. The Great Depression of the 
1930s was not self-consciously engineered by anyone; increases in the unemployment or 
inflation rate, or in the price of gasoline, may reflect market pressures rather than 
intentional action. Nonetheless, there is a pervasive human tendency to think that effects 
are caused by intentional action, especially by those who stand to benefit (the “cui 
bono?” maxim), and for this reason conspiracy theories have considerable but 
unwarranted appeal.16 On one reading of Popper’s account, those who accept conspiracy 
theories are following a sensible heuristic, to the effect that consequences are intended; 
that heuristic often works well but it also produces systematic errors, especially in the 
context of outcomes that are a product of social interactions among numerous people. 
Popper captures an important feature of some conspiracy theories. Their appeal 
lies in the attribution of otherwise inexplicable events to intentional action, and to an 
unwillingness to accept the possibility that significant adverse consequences may be a 
product of invisible hand mechanisms (such as market forces or evolutionary pressures) 
or of simple chance,17 rather than of anyone’s plans.18  A conspiracy theory posits that a 
social outcome evidences an underlying intentional order, overlooking the possibility that 
the outcome arises from either spontaneous order or random forces. Popper is picking up 
on a still more general fact about human psychology, which is that most people do not 
like to believe that significant events were caused by bad (or good) luck, and much prefer 
simpler causal stories.19 Note, however, that the domain of Popper’s explanation is quite 
limited. Many conspiracy theories, including those involving political assassinations and 
the attacks of 9/11, point to events that are indeed the result of intentional action, and the 
conspiracy theorists go wrong not by positing intentional actors, but by misidentifying 
them.  
A broader point is that conspiracy theories overestimate the competence and 
discretion of officials and bureaucracies, who are assumed to be able to make and carry 
out sophisticated secret plans, despite abundant evidence that in open societies 
                                                 
15 See Karl R. Popper, The Conspiracy Theory of Society, in CONSPIRACY THEORIES, supra note 8; see also 
KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOL. 2 (1966). 
16 Id. 
17 See NASSIM TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS (2001). 
18 An illuminating discussion is Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The Invisible Hand and the Cunning of Reason, 64 SOC. 
RES. 181 (1997). 
19 See Taleb, supra note. 
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government action does not usually remain secret for very long.20 Recall that a distinctive 
feature of conspiracy theories is that they attribute immense power to the agents of the 
conspiracy; the attribution is usually implausible but also makes the theories especially 
vulnerable to challenge. Consider all the work that must be done to hide and to cover up 
the government’s role in producing a terrorist attack on its own territory, or in arranging 
to kill political opponents. In a closed society, secrets are not difficult to keep, and 
distrust of official accounts makes a great deal of sense. In such societies, conspiracy 
theories are both more likely to be true and harder to show to be false in light of available 
information.21 But when the press is free, and when checks and balances are in force, 
government cannot easily keep its conspiracies hidden for long. These points do not mean 
that it is logically impossible, even in free societies, that conspiracy theories are true. But 
it does mean that institutional checks make it unlikely, in such societies, that powerful 
groups can keep dark secrets for extended periods, at least if those secrets involve 
important events with major social salience.  
An especially useful account suggests that what makes (unjustified) conspiracy 
theories unjustified is that those who accept them must also accept a kind of spreading 
distrust of all knowledge-producing institutions, in a way that makes it difficult to believe 
anything at all.22  To think, for example, that U.S. government officials destroyed the 
World Trade Center and then covered their tracks requires an ever-widening conspiracy 
theory, in which the 9/11 Commission, congressional leaders, the FBI, and the media 
were either participants in or dupes of the conspiracy.  But anyone who believed that 
would undercut the grounds for many of their other beliefs, which are warranted only by 
trust in the knowledge-producing institutions created by government and society. How 
many other things must not be believed, if we are not to believe something accepted by 
so many diverse actors? There may not be a logical contradiction here, but conspiracy 
theorists might well have to question a number of propositions that they seem willing to 
take for granted. As Robert Anton Wilson notes of the conspiracy theories advanced by 
Holocaust deniers, “a conspiracy that can deceive us about 6,000,000 deaths can deceive 
us about anything, and [then] it takes a great leap of faith for Holocaust Revisionists to 
believe World War II happened at all, or that Franklin Roosevelt did serve as President 
from 1933 to 1945, or that Marilyn Monroe was more ‘real’ than King Kong or Donald 
Duck.”23   
 This is not, and is not be intended to be, a general claim that conspiracy theories 
are unjustified or unwarranted.  Much depends on the background state of knowledge-
producing institutions.  If those institutions are generally trustworthy, in part because they 
are embedded in an open society with a well-functioning marketplace of ideas and free 
flow of information, then conspiracy theories will generally (which is not to say always) 
be unjustified.  On the other hand, individuals in societies with systematically 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
16, 2005, at A1; Jane Mayer, The Black Sites: A Rare Look Inside the C.I.A.’s Secret Interrogation 
Program, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, at 46. 
21 Consider here Amartya  Sen’s finding that in the history of the world, no famine has occurred in a nation 
with a free press and democratic elections. See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines (1983). Of course it 
would be excessive to infer that in authoritarian nations, famines are a “conspiracy” of the authoritarians.  
22 Brian L. Keeley, Of Conspiracy Theories, in CONSPIRACY THEORIES, supra note 8, at 46, 56-57.  
23 Quoted in id. at 57.  
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malfunctioning or skewed institutions of knowledge – say, individuals who live in an 
authoritarian regime lacking a free press – may have good reason to distrust all or most of 
the official denials they hear. For these individuals, conspiracy theories will more often 
be warranted, whether or not true.  Likewise, individuals embedded in isolated groups or 
small, self-enclosed networks who are exposed only to skewed information will more 
often hold conspiracy theories that are justified, relative to their limited informational 
environment. Holocaust denials might themselves be considered in this light.  When 
isolated groups operate within a society that is both wider and more open, their theories 
may be unjustified from the standpoint of the wider society but justified from the 
standpoint of the group if it maintains its isolation.  In these situations, the problem for 
the wider society is to breach the informational isolation of the small group or network, a 
problem we discuss below.  
On our account, a defining feature of conspiracy theories is that they are 
extremely resistant to correction, certainly through direct denials or counterspeech by 
government officials. Those who accept such theories believe that the agents of the 
conspiracy have unusual powers, so that apparently contrary evidence can usually be 
shown to be a product of the conspiracy itself. Conspiracy theories display the 
characteristic features of a “degenerating research program”24 in which contrary evidence 
is explained away by adding epicycles and resisting falsification of key tenets.25  Some 
epistemologists argue that this resistance to falsification is not objectionable if one also 
believes that there are conspirators deliberately attempting to plant evidence that would 
falsify the conspiracy theory.26  However that may be as a philosophical matter, the self-
sealing quality of conspiracy theories creates serious practical problems for government; 
direct attempts to dispel the theory can usually be folded into the theory itself, as just one 
more ploy by powerful machinators to cover their tracks.  A denial may, for example, be 
taken as a confirmation. In this way, conspiracy theories create challenges that are 
distinct from those posed by false but dangerous beliefs (recall the belief that prolonged 
exposure to sunlight is good for you or that climate change is not occurring). 
Accordingly, we will focus on indirect means of undermining such theories, principally 
by breaking up the closed informational networks that produce such theories. 
So far we have discussed some epistemological features of conspiracy theories, in 
the abstract.  We now turn to the sociology of conspiracy theorizing, examining the 
mechanisms by which such theories arise and expand. 
B. How Conspiracy Theories  Arise and Spread 
1. Crippled epistemologies. Why do people accept conspiracy theories that turn 
out to be false and for which the evidence is weak or even nonexistent? It is tempting to 
answer in terms of individual pathology.27 Perhaps conspiracy theories are a product of 
                                                 
24 Imre Lakatos, Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in CRITICISM AND THE 
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 91 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970); see Steve Clarke, Conspiracy 
Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing, in CONSPIRACY THEORIES, supra note 8, at 78. 
25 See Diana G. Tumminia, WHEN PROPHECY NEVER FAILS: MYTH AND REALITY IN A FLYING-SAUCER 
GROUP (2005). 
26 Keeley, supra note 22, at 55-56.  
27 See Richard Hofstader, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS (1979); Robert S. Robins & Jerrold M. Post, POLITICAL PARANOIA (1997).  
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mental illness, such as paranoia or narcissism. And indeed, there can be no doubt that 
some people who accept conspiracy theories are mentally ill and subject to delusions.28 
But we have seen that in many communities and even nations, such theories are widely 
held. It is not plausible to suggest that all or most members of those communities are 
afflicted by mental illness. The most important conspiracy theories are hardly limited to 
those who suffer from any kind of pathology. 
For our purposes, the most useful way to understand the pervasiveness of 
conspiracy theories is to examine how people acquire information.29 For most of what 
they believe that they know, human beings lack personal or direct information; they must 
rely on what other people think. In some domains, people suffer from a “crippled 
epistemology,” in the sense that they know very few things, and what they know is 
wrong.30 Many extremists fall in this category; their extremism stems not from 
irrationality, but from the fact that they have little (relevant) information, and their 
extremist views are supported by what little they know.31 Conspiracy theorizing often has 
the same feature. Those who believe that Israel was responsible for the attacks of 9/11, or 
that the Central Intelligence Agency killed President Kennedy, may well be responding 
quite rationally to the informational signals that they receive.   
Consider here the suggestive fact that terrorism is more likely to arise in nations 
that lack civil rights and civil liberties.32 An evident reason for the connection is that 
terrorism is an extreme form of political protest, and when people lack the usual outlets 
for registering their protest, they might resort to violence.33 But consider another 
possibility: When civil rights and civil liberties are restricted, little information is 
available, and what comes from government cannot be trusted. If the trustworthy 
information justifies conspiracy theories and extremism, and (therefore?) violence, then 
terrorism is more likely to arise. 
  2. Rumors and speculation. Of course it is necessary to specify how, exactly, 
conspiracy theories begin.. Some such theories seem to bubble up spontaneously, 
appearing roughly simultaneously in many different social networks; others are initiated 
and spread, quite intentionally, by conspiracy entrepreneurs who profit directly or 
indirectly from propagating their theories.  An example in the latter category is the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Another common idea treats conspiracy theories as a form of collective paranoid delusion.  See, e.g., Deiter 
Groh, The Temptation of Conspiracy Theory, in CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CONSPIRACY, supra note 8, at 
1.  Our suggestion is that the lens of psychopathology is not helpful, whether it is interpreted in individual 
or collective terms.  
28 See Erich Wulff, Paranoic Conspiratory Delusion, in CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CONSPIRACY, supra 
note 8, at 172.  
29 There is an immense and growing literature on this question. For examples, with relevant citations, see 
Glaeser, supra; Sendhil Mullainathan and Andrei Shleifer, The Market for News, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1031 
(2005); Sendhil Mullainathan and Andrei Shleifer, Media Bias (2002), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9295.pdf; Edward Glaeser and Cass R. Sunstein, Extremism and Social 
Learning, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2008).  
30 Russell Hardin, The Crippled Epistemology of Extremism, in POLITICAL RATIONALITY AND EXTREMISM 
3, 16 (Albert Breton et al. eds., 2002). 
31 Id. Of course it is also true that many extremists  have become extreme, or stayed extreme, after being 
exposed to a great deal of information on various sides. 
32 See KRUEGER, supra note 10, at 75-82. 
33 See id. at 89-90.  
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French author Thierry Meyssan, whose book “9/11: The Big Lie” became a bestseller and 
a sensation for its claims that the Pentagon explosion on 9/11 was caused by a missile, 
fired as the opening salvo of a coup d’etat by the military-industrial complex, rather than 
by American Airlines Flight 77.  Some conspiracy entrepreneurs are entirely sincere; 
others are interested in money or power, or in achieving some general social goal. Still, 
even for conspiracy theories put about by conspiracy entrepreneurs, the key question is 
why some theories take hold while many more do not, and vanish into obscurity. 
 
 Whenever a bad event has occurred, rumors and speculation are inevitable. Most 
people are not able to know, on the basis of personal or direct knowledge, why an 
airplane crashed, or why a leader was assassinated, or why a terrorist attack succeeded. In 
the aftermath of such an event, numerous speculations will be offered, and some of them 
will likely point to some kind of conspiracy.  To some people, those speculations will 
seem plausible, perhaps because they provide a suitable outlet for outrage and blame, 
perhaps because the speculation fits well with other deeply rooted beliefs that they hold. 
Terrible events produce outrage, and when people are outraged, they are all the more 
likely to attribute those events to intentional action. In addition, antecedent beliefs are a 
key to the success or failure of conspiracy theories. Some people would find it impossibly 
jarring to think that the CIA was responsible for the assassination of a civil rights leader; 
that thought would unsettle too many of their other judgments. Others would find those 
other judgments strongly supported, even confirmed, by the suggestion that the CIA was 
responsible for such an assassination. Compare the case of terrorist attacks. For most 
Americans, a claim that the United States government attacked its own citizens, for some 
ancillary purpose, would make it impossible to hold onto a wide range of other 
judgments. Clearly this point does not hold for many people in Islamic nations, for whom 
it is far from jarring to believe that responsibility lies with the United States (or Israel). 
 
 Here, as elsewhere, people attempt to find some kind of equilibrium among their 
assortment of beliefs,34 and acceptance or rejection of a conspiracy theory will often 
depend on which of the two leads to equilibrium. Some beliefs are also motivated, in the 
sense that people are pleased to hold them or displeased to reject them.35 Acceptance (or 
for that matter rejection) of a conspiracy theory is frequently motivated in that sense. 
Reactions to a claim of conspiracy to assassinate a political leader, or to commit or to 
allow some atrocity either domestically or abroad, are often determined by the 
motivations of those who hear the claim. 
  
  These are points about individual judgments, bracketing social influences. But 
after some bad event has occurred, those influences are crucial, for most people will have 
little or no direct information about its cause. How many people know, directly or on the 
basis of personal investigation, whether Al Qaeda was responsible for the 9/11 attacks, or 
whether Lee Harvey Oswald killed President Kennedy on his own, or whether a tragic 
death in an apparent airplane accident was truly accidental? Inevitably people must rely 
                                                 
34 See W.V. Quine & J.S. Ullian, THE WEB OF BELIEF (2d ed. 1978).  On the search for reflective 
equilibrium in general, see John Rawls, A  THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).  
35 For a classic case study, see Leon Festinger et al., WHEN PROPHECY FAILS (1956). For a general 
treatment, see Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME) (2007). 
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on the beliefs of other people. Some people will require a great deal of evidence in order 
to accept a conspiracy theory; others will require much less. People will therefore have 
different “thresholds” for accepting or rejecting such a theory and for acting on the basis 
of the theory.36 One way to meet a relevant threshold is to supply direct or indirect 
evidence. Another way is simply to show that some, many, or most (trusted) people 
accept or reject the theory. These are the appropriate circumstances for social cascades, in 
particular informational cascades, whose dynamics help to explain the pervasive 
acceptance of conspiracy theories.   
  
 3. Conspiracy cascades, 1: the role of information. To see how informational 
cascades work, imagine a group of people who are trying to assign responsibility for 
some loss of life.  Assume that the group members are announcing their views in 
sequence. Each member attends, reasonably enough, to the judgments of others.  
Andrews is the first to speak.  He suggests that the event was caused by a conspiracy of 
powerful people.  Barnes now knows Andrews’s judgment; she should certainly go along 
with Andrew’s account if she agrees independently with him.  But if her independent 
judgment is otherwise, she would—if she trusts Andrews no more and no less than she 
trusts herself—be indifferent about what to do, and she might simply flip a coin. 
 
Now turn to a third person, Charleton.  Suppose that both Andrews and Barnes have 
endorsed the conspiracy theory, but that Charleton’s own view, based on limited 
information, suggests that they are probably wrong.  In that event, Charleton might well 
ignore what he knows and follow Andrews and Barnes.  It is likely, after all, that both 
Andrews and Barnes had evidence for their conclusion, and unless Charleton thinks that 
his own information is better than theirs, he should follow their lead.  If he does, 
Charleton is in a cascade.  Of course Charleton will resist if he has sufficient grounds to 
think that Andrews and Barnes are being foolish. But if he lacks those grounds, he is 
likely to go along with them. 
 
Now suppose that Charleton is speaking in response to what Andrews and Barnes 
did, not on the basis of his own information, and also that later people know what 
Andrews, Barnes, and Charleton said.  On reasonable assumptions, they will reach the 
same conclusion regardless of their private information (which, we are supposing, is 
relevant but inconclusive).  This will happen even if Andrews initially speculated in a 
way that does not fit the facts. That initial speculation, in this example, can start a process 
by which a number of people are led to participate in a cascade, accepting a conspiracy 
theory whose factual foundations are fragile. 
 
Of course the example is highly stylized and in that sense unrealistic; conspiracy 
cascades arise through more complex processes, in which diverse thresholds are 
important. In a standard pattern, the conspiracy theory is initially accepted by people with 
low thresholds for its acceptance. Sometimes the informational pressure builds, to the 
point where many people, with somewhat higher thresholds, begin to accept the theory 
too. As a real-world example of a conspiracy cascade, consider the existence of certain 
                                                 
36 For general discussion of the importance of thresholds, see Marc Granovetter, Threshold Models of 
Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC. 1420 (1978). 
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judgments about the origins and causes of AIDS, with some groups believing, 
implausibly, that the virus was produced in government laboratories.37 These and other 
views about AIDS are a product of social interactions and in particular of cascade effects.  
 
4. Conspiracy cascades, 2: the role of reputation. Conspiracy theories do not take 
hold only because of information. Sometimes people profess belief in a conspiracy 
theory, or at least suppress their doubts, because they seek to curry favor. Reputational 
pressures help account for conspiracy theories, and they feed conspiracy cascades. 
 
 In a reputational cascade, people think that they know what is right, or what is likely 
to be right, but they nonetheless go along with the crowd in order to maintain the good 
opinion of others.  Suppose that Albert suggests that the Central Intelligence Agency was 
responsible for the assassination of President Kennedy, and that Barbara concurs with 
Albert, not because she actually thinks that Albert is right, but because she does not wish 
to seem, to Albert, to be some kind of dupe.  If Albert and Barbara say that the CIA was 
responsible for the assassination of President Kennedy, Cynthia might not contradict 
them publicly and might even appear to share their judgment -- not because she believes 
that judgment to be correct, but because she does not want to face their hostility or lose 
their good opinion. It should be easy to see how this process might generate a cascade.  
Once Albert, Barbara, and Cynthia offer a united front on the issue, their friend David 
might be reluctant to contradict them even if he thinks that they are wrong.  The 
apparently shared view of Albert, Barbara, and Cynthia carry information; that view 
might be right.  But even if David has reason to believe that they are wrong, he might not 
want to take them on publicly. His own silence will help build the informational and 
reputational pressure on those who follow. 
 
 5. Conspiracy cascades, 3: the role of availability. Informational and reputational 
cascades can occur without any particular triggering event. But a distinctive kind of 
cascade arises when such an event is highly salient or cognitively “available.”  In the 
context of many risks, such as those associated with terrorism, nuclear power, and 
abandoned hazardous waste dumps, a particular  event initiates a cascade, and it stands as 
a trigger or a symbol justifying public concern, whether or not that concern is 
warranted.38 Availability cascades occur through the interaction between a salient event 
and social influences, both informational and reputational. Often political actors, both 
self-interested and altruistic, work hard to produce such cascades. 
 
 Conspiracy theories are often driven through the same mechanisms. A particular  
event becomes available, and conspiracy theories are invoked both in explaining it and 
using it as a symbol for broader social forces, casting doubt on accepted wisdom in many 
domains. Within certain nations and groups, the claim that the United States or Israel was 
responsible for the attacks of 9/11 fits well within a general narrative about who is the 
                                                 
37 See Fabio Lorenzi-Cioldi & Alain Clémence, Group Processes and the Construction of Social 
Representations, in GROUP PROCESSES, at 311, 315–17 (Michael A. Hogg & R. Scott Tindale eds., 2001). 
38 See Punctuated Equilibrium and the Dynamics of U.S. Environmental Policy (Robert Repetto ed. 2006); 
Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 
(1999). 
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aggressor, and the liar, in a series of disputes – and the view that Al Qaeda was 
responsible raises questions about that same narrative. Conspiracy theories are frequently 
a product of availability cascades. 
 
6. Group polarization. There are clear links between cascades and the well-
established phenomenon of group polarization, by which members of a deliberating 
group typically end up in a more extreme position in line with their tendencies before 
deliberation began.39 Group polarization has been found in hundreds of studies involving 
over a dozen countries.40 Belief in conspiracy theories is often fueled by group 
polarization. 
 
Consider, as the clearest example, the  finding that those who disapprove of the 
United States, and are suspicious of its intentions, will increase their disapproval and 
suspicion if they exchange points of view. There is specific evidence of this phenomenon 
among citizens of France: With respect to foreign aid, they trust the United States a great 
deal less, and suspect its intentions a great deal more, after they talk with one another.41 It 
should be easy to see how similar effects could occur for conspiracy theories. Those who 
tend to think that Israel was responsible for the attacks of 9/11, and who speak with one 
another, will end up with a greater commitment to that belief. 
 
Group polarization occurs for reasons that parallel the mechanisms that produce 
cascades.42 Informational influences play a large role. In any group with some initial 
inclination, the views of most people in the group will inevitably be skewed in the 
direction of that inclination. As a result of hearing the various arguments, social 
interactions will lead people toward a more extreme point in line with what group 
members initially believed. Reputational factors matter as well. People usually want to be 
perceived favorably by other group members. Once they hear what others believe, some 
will adjust their positions at least slightly in the direction of the dominant position. For 
purposes of understanding the spread of conspiracy theories, it is especially important to 
note that group polarization is particularly likely, and particularly pronounced, when 
people have a shared sense of identity and are connected by bonds of solidarity.43 These 
are circumstances in which arguments by outsiders, unconnected with the group, will lack 
much credibility, and fail to have much of an effect in reducing polarization.  As we will 
explore below, these circumstances imply that direct government rebuttals of the reigning 
conspiracy theory will prove ineffective; government will instead do best by using 
various tactics of cognitive infiltration to break up the polarized information cluster from 
within. 
 
7.  Selection effects.  A crippled epistemology can arise not only from informational 
and reputational dynamics within a given group, but also from self-selection of members 
                                                 
39 See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 202–26 (2003). 
40 See id. at 204. 
41 Id. at 223–24. 
42 See id. at 212–22, 226–45; Robert S. Baron & Norbert L. Kerr, GROUP PROCESS, GROUP DECISION, 
GROUP ACTION (2d ed. 2001), at 540. 
43 See Cass R. Sunstein, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003). 
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into and out of groups with extreme views.44  Once polarization occurs or cascades arise, 
and the group’s median view begins to move in a certain direction, doubters and halfway-
believers will tend to depart while intense believers remain.  The overall size of the group 
may shrink, but the group may also pick up new believers who are even more committed, 
and in any event the remaining members will, by self-selection, display more fanaticism.  
Group members may engage in a kind of double-think, segregating themselves, in a 
physical or informational sense, in order to protect their beliefs from challenge by 
outsiders.45  Even if the rank and file cannot coherently do this, group leaders may 
enforce segregation in order to insulate the rank and file from information or arguments 
that would undermine the leaders’ hold on the group.   
 
Members of informationally and socially isolated groups tend to display a kind of 
paranoid cognition46 and become increasingly distrustful or suspicious of the motives of 
others or of the larger society, falling into a “sinister attribution error.”47  This error 
occurs when people feel that they are under pervasive scrutiny, and hence they attribute 
personalistic motives to outsiders and overestimate the amount of attention they receive. 
Benign actions that happen to disadvantage the group are taken as purposeful plots, 
intended to harm.48  Although these conditions resemble individual-level pathologies, 
they arise from the social and informational structure of the group, especially those 
operating in enclosed or closely knit networks, and are not usefully understood as a form 
of mental illness.  The social etiology of such conditions suggests that the appropriate 
remedy is not individual treatment, but the introduction of cognitive, informational, and 
social diversity into the isolated networks that supply extremist theories.  We take up the 
resulting policy problems in the next Part. 
II.  Governmental Responses 
 What can government do about conspiracy theories?  Among the things it can do, 
what should it do? We can readily imagine a series of possible responses. (1) 
Government might ban conspiracy theorizing. (2) Government might impose some kind 
of tax, financial or otherwise, on those who disseminate such theories. (3) Government 
might itself engage in counterspeech, marshaling arguments to discredit conspiracy 
theories. (4) Government might formally hire credible private parties to engage in 
counterspeech. (5) Government might engage in informal communication with such 
parties, encouraging them to help.  Each instrument has a distinctive set of potential 
effects, or costs and benefits, and each will have a place under imaginable conditions.  
However, our main policy idea is that government should engage in cognitive infiltration 
of the groups that produce conspiracy theories, which involves a mix of (3), (4) and (5). 
 If one believes that conspiracy theories are in some sense inconsequential, the 
best answer will be for government to ignore them. If children believe in Santa Claus or 
the Easter Bunny, there is no problem for government to solve; and the belief that the 
                                                 
44 Hardin, supra note 30, at 9-12. 
45 Id. at 10. 
46 Id. at 11; Hofstadter, supra note 27. 
47 Roderick M. Kramer, The Sinister Attribution Error: Paranoid Cognition and Collective Distrust in 
Organizations, 18 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 199, 199-230 (1994).  
48 Id. 
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government covered up the landing of space aliens in Roswell does not seem to be 
causing discernible harm, with the possible exception of bad television shows. (This does 
not imply that government should ignore conspiracy theories only if they are 
inconsequential.  As we will see, under certain conditions government may do best to 
ignore conspiracy theories and theorists even if it justifiably fears that they will have 
harmful effects, because government action may make things worse.)  In Section A, 
however, we give some reasons to think that some conspiracy theories are consequential 
indeed. 
 In Section B, we address several dilemmas of governmental response to 
conspiracy theories and theorists.  Is it best to ignore them, creating a risk that the theory 
will spread unrebutted, or to address them, with the risk that addressing the theory will 
legitimate and even be taken to confirm it?  Assuming budget constraints and limited 
resources, should government efforts focus on debiasing the conspiracy theorists 
themselves, or solely on preventing the spread of conspiracy theories among the larger 
population?  How can government get behind or around the distinctive feature of 
conspiracy theories -- their self-sealing quality, which tends to fold government’s denials 
into the theory itself as further evidence of the conspiracy?   
An obvious answer is to maintain an open society, in which those who are 
tempted to subscribe to conspiracy theories do not distrust all knowledge-creating 
institutions, and are exposed to corrections. But we have seen that even in open societies, 
conspiracy theories have some traction; and open societies have a strong interest in 
debunking such theories when they arise, and threaten to cause harm, in closed societies. 
Here we suggest two concrete ideas for government officials attempting to fashion a 
response to such theories.  First, responding to more rather than fewer conspiracy theories 
has a kind of synergy benefit: it reduces the legitimating effect of responding to any one 
of them, because it dilutes the contrast with unrebutted theories.  Second, we suggest a 
distinctive tactic for breaking up the hard core of extremists who supply conspiracy 
theories: cognitive infiltration of extremist groups, whereby government agents or their 
allies (acting either virtually or in real space, and either openly or anonymously) will 
undermine the crippled epistemology of those who subscribe to such theories. They do so 
by planting doubts about the theories and stylized facts that circulate within such groups, 
thereby introducing beneficial cognitive diversity.49
 In Section C, we examine the role of law and judges in fashioning the 
government’s response.  We will ask whether judges do more good than harm by 
invoking statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act to force government to disclose 
facts that would rebut conspiracy theories.  Our conclusions are generally skeptical: there 
is little reason to believe that judges can improve on administrative choices in these 
situations.  Section D concludes with some brief notes on government efforts to dispel 
conspiracy theories held by foreign audiences, especially in Muslim countries. 
 Throughout, we assume a well-motivated government that aims to eliminate 
conspiracy theories, or draw their poison, if and only if social welfare is improved by 
doing so. (We do not offer a particular account of social welfare, taking the term instead 
as a placeholder for the right account.) This is a standard assumption in policy analysis, 
                                                 
49 On those benefits in general, see Scott Page, THE DIFFERENCE (2006). 
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and is useful for clarifying the policy questions, but we note that real-world governments 
can instead be purveyors of conspiracy theories.  In Egypt, newspapers effectively 
controlled by the governing regime regularly spread conspiracy theories about Jews.50  
Some believe that the Bush administration deliberately spread a kind of false and 
unwarranted conspiracy theory – that Saddam Hussein conspired with Al Qaeda to 
support the 9/11 attacks.51  Suppose for discussion’s sake that this is so; then a future 
administration motivated to improve social welfare would need to consider whether this 
theory is false and harmful, and if it is what can and should be done about it.  But this 
would just be another case of a conspiracy theory circulating in the population, which 
might or might not be worth responding to, in light of the considerations we adduce 
below.  Nothing of theoretical interest follows from this case for the questions we address 
here, which strictly involve optimal responses to conspiracy theories on the part of a (real 
or imagined) well-motivated government.        
A.  Are Conspiracy Theories Consequential? 
 One line of thinking denies that conspiracy theories matter.52  There are several 
possible reasons to think so.  First, conspiracy theories may be held by only a tiny 
fraction of the population.  Perhaps only a handful of kooks believe that U.S. government 
officials had any kind of role in the events of 9/11.  Second, even if a particular 
conspiracy theory is widely held in the sense that many people will confess to it when 
polled, conspiracy theories may typically be held as “quasi-beliefs” – beliefs that are not 
costly and possibly even fun to hold, like a belief in aliens in Roswell or UFOs, and that 
do not form a premise for action.53  Many people profess to believe, and in some sense do 
believe, that eternal life depends upon actions that they do not take.  So too, perhaps 
many people quasi-believe in conspiracy theories yet do not take action on account of 
those quasi-beliefs.   
In both cases everything depends, of course, on which conspiracy theory and 
which population one is discussing. However, as discussed in Part I, there is ample 
evidence that some conspiracy theories are not at all confined to small segments of the 
population.  Overseas, “a 2002 Gallup Poll conducted in nine Islamic countries found that 
61 percent of those surveyed thought that Muslims had nothing to do with the attacks of 
Sept. 11, 2001.”54  According to an anonymous State Department official in charge of 
anti-disinformation, “a great deal of harm can result ‘when people believe these lies and 
                                                 
50 See Scott Macleod, Suspicious Minds; In the Arab World, Conspiracy Theories and Rising Anti-Semitism 
Deflect Attention From Real Problems, TIME, June 17, 2002, at 28. 
51 See, e.g., Frank Rich, Editorial, Dishonest, Reprehensible, Corrupt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at 11  
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52 See Clarke, supra note 24, at 91 (noting that “few  [conspiracy theories] are actually harmful”).  
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(2007).  
54 Richard Cohen, Editorial, The Making of a Conspiracy Theory, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2003, at A21; see 
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then act on the basis of their mistaken beliefs.’”  For example, “Al-Qaeda members ‘were 
encouraged to join the jihad at least in part because of disinformation.’”55
The point about quasi-beliefs suggests that many do not in fact take any action on 
the basis of their mistaken beliefs.  However, this does not at all entail that conspiracy 
theories are inconsequential.  Even if only a small fraction of adherents to a particular 
conspiracy theory act on the basis of their beliefs, that small fraction may be enough to 
cause serious harms.  Consider the Oklahoma City bombing, whose perpetrators shared a 
complex of conspiratorial beliefs about the federal government.  Many who shared their 
beliefs did not act on them, but a few actors did, with terrifying consequences.  James 
Fearon and others argue that technological change has driven down the costs of 
delivering attacks with weapons of mass destruction, to the point where even a small 
group can pose a significant threat.56  If so, and if only a tiny fraction of believers act on 
their beliefs, then as the total population with conspiratorial beliefs grows, it becomes 
nearly inevitable that action will ensue. 
In cases of this sort, the conspiracy theory itself supports affirmatively violent 
action on the part of its believers (which only a small fraction will actually take); 
conspiracy theorizing leads to an actual conspiracy.  Within a network whose members 
believe that the federal government, say, is a hostile and morally repellent organization 
that is taking over the country, akin to a foreign invader, armed resistance will seem a 
sensible course to at least some fraction of the believers.  In other, perhaps more 
common, cases the conspiracy theory will be of a different nature and will not directly 
indicate such action.  However, such theories can still have pernicious effects from the 
government’s point of view, either by inducing unjustifiably widespread public 
skepticism about the government’s assertions, or by dampening public mobilization and 
participation in government-led efforts, or both.  The widespread belief that U.S. officials 
knowingly allowed 9/11 to happen or even brought it about may have hampered the 
government’s efforts to mobilize social resources and political support for measures 
against future terrorist attacks.   
In the nature of things it is hard to find evidence for, or against, such possibilities; 
yet it hardly seems sensible to say that because such evidence is lacking, government 
should do nothing about a potentially harmful conspiracy theory.  That precept would be 
paralyzing, because there are uncertain harms on all sides of the question, and because – 
as in the case of the Oklahoma City bombing – some of those harms may approach the 
catastrophic.57   
B.  Dilemmas and Responses 
 Imagine a government facing a population in which a particular conspiracy theory 
is becoming widespread.  We will identify two basic dilemmas that recur, and consider 
how government should respond.  The first dilemma is whether to ignore or rebut the 
theory; the second is whether to address the supply side of conspiracy theorizing by 
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attempting to debias or disable its purveyors, to address the demand side by attempting to 
immunize third-party audiences from the theory’s effects, or to do both (if resource 
constraints permit). 
 In both cases, the underlying structure of the problem is that conspiracy theorizing 
is a multi-party game.  Government is faced with suppliers of conspiracy theories, and 
might aim at least in part to persuade, debias, or silence those suppliers.  However, those 
two players are competing for the hearts and minds of third parties, especially the mass 
audience of the uncommitted.58  Expanding the cast further, one may see the game as 
involving four players: government officials, conspiracy theorists, mass audiences, and 
independent experts – such as mainstream scientists or the editors of Popular Mechanics 
– whom government attempts to enlist to give credibility to its rebuttal efforts.  The 
discussion that follows generally assumes the three-party structure, but we will refer to 
the four-party structure when relevant. 
 1.   Ignore or rebut? 
 The first dilemma is that either ignoring or rebutting a conspiracy theory has 
distinctive costs.  Ignoring the theory allows its proponents to draw ominous inferences 
from the government’s silence.  If the theory stands unrebutted, one possibility is that it is 
too ludicrous to need rebuttal, but another is that the government cannot offer relevant 
evidence to the contrary; the suppliers of the conspiracy theories will propose the second 
inference.  On this view, all misinformation (the initial conspiracy theory) should be met 
with countermisinformation. 
  On the other hand, to rebut the theory may be to legitimate it, moving the theory 
from the zone of claims too ludicrous to be discussed to the zone of claims that, whether 
or not true, are in some sense worth discussing.  This legitimation effect can arise in one 
of two ways.  First, third-party audiences may infer from the government’s rebuttal 
efforts that the government estimates the conspiracy theory to be plausible, and fears that 
the third parties will themselves be persuaded.  Second, some members of the audience 
may infer that many other members of the audience must believe the theory, or 
government would not be taking the trouble to rebut it.  Consider circumstances of 
“pluralistic ignorance,” in which citizens are unsure what other citizens believe.59 
Citizens may take the fact of rebuttal itself as supplying information about the beliefs of 
other citizens, and may even use this information in forming their own beliefs. The 
government’s rebuttal may be a signal that other citizens believe in the conspiracy theory 
– and may therefore make the theory more plausible. If the number who follow this 
cognitive strategy and thus adopt a belief in the theory exceeds the number who are 
persuaded by the rebuttal, the perverse result of the rebuttal may then be to increase the 
number of believers. 
 How should government cope with this dilemma?  In a typical pattern, 
government plays a wait-and-see strategy: ignore the conspiracy theory until it reaches 
some ill-defined threshold level of widespread popularity, and then rebut.  There is a 
straightforward logic to this strategy.  First, when the government ignores the theory, 
either the relevant audiences will draw an inference that the theory is silly, or else will 
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infer that the government cannot effectively deny it.  If the conspiracy theory does not 
spread despite government’s silence, the former inference is probably dominant, and 
response is unnecessary.  Second, there is an option value60 to the strategy of ignoring the 
theory: a public rebuttal now is costly or impossible to undo, but maintaining silence now 
leaves government with the option to rebut later, if it chooses to do so.  On this approach, 
when faced with a spreading conspiracy theory, government should wait until the 
marginal expected benefits of further delay just equal the marginal expected costs of 
leaving the theory unrebutted.  Finally and most generally, it seems silly and infeasible to 
chase after and rebut every conspiracy theory that comes to government’s attention. 
 However, this logic overlooks an important synergistic gain: rebutting many 
conspiracy theories can reduce the legitimating effect of rebutting any one of them.  
When government rebuts a particular theory while ignoring most others, the legitimating 
effect arises at least in part because of a contrast between the foreground and the 
background: the inference is that government has picked the theory it is rebutting out of 
the larger set because this theory, unlike the others, is inherently plausible or is gaining 
traction among some sectors of the mass audience.  Rebutting a larger fraction of the total 
background set reduces the strength of this inference as to each theory chosen for 
rebuttal.  The more theories government rebuts, the weaker is the implicit legitimating 
signal sent by the very fact of rebuttal.   
 It is impossible to say, in the abstract, how great this synergistic gain may be.  It 
remains true that not every conspiracy theory proposed by someone somewhere (that 
comes to the attention of relevant government officials) warrants a response.  However, 
the implication is that government should rebut more conspiracy theories than it would 
otherwise choose, if assessing the expected costs and benefits of rebuttal on a theory-by-
theory basis.  Because of synergy effects, government action considered over an array or 
range of cases may have different total costs and benefits than when those cases are 
considered one by one.  Practically speaking, government might do well to maintain a 
more vigorous countermisinformation establishment than it would otherwise do, one that 
identifies and rebuts many more conspiracy theories would otherwise be rebutted.  There 
will still have to be some minimum threshold for governmental response, but the 
threshold will be lower than it would be if this synergistic gain of rebutting many theories 
did not exist. 
 2.  Which audience? 
 Another dilemma is whether to target the supply side of the conspiracy theory or 
the demand side.  Should governmental responses be addressed to the suppliers, with a 
view to persuading or silencing them, or rather be addressed to the mass audience, with a 
view to inoculating them from pernicious theories?  Of course these two strategies are not 
mutually exclusive as a logical matter; perhaps the best approach is to straddle the two 
audiences with a single response or simply to provide multiple responses.  However, if 
there are resource constraints, government may face a choice about where to place its 
emphases.  The question will be what mix of second-party responses (pitched to the 
suppliers) and third-party responses (pitched to the mass audience) is best.  Moreover, 
apart from resource constraints, there are intrinsic tradeoffs across these strategies.  The 
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very arguments that are most convincing to the mass audience may be least convincing to 
the conspiracists, and vice-versa. 
 We will begin with some remarks about responses addressed to the supply side.  
The basic problem with pitching governmental responses to the suppliers of conspiracy 
theories is that those theories, by their nature, have a self-sealing quality.  They are (1) 
resistant and in extreme cases invulnerable to contrary evidence,61 and (2) especially 
resistant to contrary evidence offered by the government, because the government 
rebuttal is folded into the conspiracy theory itself. If conspiracy theorists are responding 
to the informational signals given by those whom they trust, then the government’s effort 
at rebuttal seems unlikely to be effective, and might serve to fortify rather than to 
undermine the original belief.  (A possible solution is for government to enlist private 
rebuttals; we return to this point shortly.) The most direct response to a dangerous 
conspiracy theories is censorship. That response is unavailable in an open society, 
because it is inconsistent with principles of freedom of expression. We could imagine 
circumstances in which a conspiracy theory became so pervasive, and so dangerous, that 
censorship would be thinkable. But in an open society, the need for censorship would be 
correspondingly reduced. In any case censorship may well turn out to be self-defeating. 
The effort to censor the theory might well be taken as evidence that the theory is true, and 
censorship of speech is notoriously difficult.  
After 9/11, one complex of conspiracy theories involved American Airlines Flight 
77, which hijackers crashed into the Pentagon.  Some theorists claimed that no plane had 
hit the Pentagon; even after the Department of Defense released video frames showing 
Flight 77 approaching the building and a later explosion cloud, theorists pointed out that 
the actual moment of impact was absent from the video, in order to keep alive their claim 
that the plane had never hit the building.  (In reality the moment of impact was not 
captured because the video had a low number of frames per second.62) Moreover, even 
those conspiracists who were persuaded that the Flight 77 conspiracy theories were 
wrong folded that view into a larger conspiracy theory.  The problem with the theory that 
no plane hit the Pentagon, they said, is that the theory was too transparently false, 
disproved by multiple witnesses and much physical evidence.  Thus the theory must have 
been a straw man initially planted by the government, in order to discredit other 
conspiracy theories and theorists by association.63
Government can partially circumvent these problems if it enlists nongovernmental 
officials in the effort to rebut the theories. It might ensure that credible independent 
experts offer the rebuttal, rather than government officials themselves.  There is a 
tradeoff between credibility and control, however.  The price of credibility is that 
government cannot be seen to control the independent experts.  Although government can 
supply these independent experts with information and perhaps prod them into action 
from behind the scenes, too close a connection will prove self-defeating if it is exposed -- 
as witness the humiliating disclosures showing that apparently independent opinions on 
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scientific and regulatory questions were in fact paid for by think-tanks with ties to the 
Bush administration.64  Even apart from this tradeoff, conspiracy theorists may still fold 
independent third-party rebuttals into their theory by making conspiratorial claims of 
connection between the third party and the government.  When Popular Mechanics 
offered its rebuttal of 9/11 conspiracy theories, conspiracists claimed that one of the 
magazine’s reporters, Ben Chertoff, was the cousin of Homeland Security Secretary 
Michael Chertoff and was spreading disinformation at the latter’s behest.65
 Because of these difficulties, many officials dismiss direct responses to the 
suppliers of conspiracy theorists as an exercise in futility.  Rather, they implicitly frame 
their responses to the third-party mass audience, hoping to stem the spread of conspiracy 
theories by dampening the demand rather than by reducing the supply.  Philip Zelikow, 
the executive director of the 9/11 commission, says that “[t]he hardcore conspiracy 
theorists are totally committed.  They’d have to repudiate much of their life identity in 
order not to accept some of that stuff.  That’s not our worry.  Our worry is when things 
become infectious . . . .  [t]hen this stuff can be deeply corrosive to public understanding.  
You can get where the bacteria can sicken the larger body.”66  Likewise, when the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology issued a fact sheet to disprove the theory 
that the World Trade Center was brought down by a controlled demolition, the 
spokesman stated that “[w]e realize this fact sheet won’t convince those who hold to the 
alternative theories that our findings are sound.  In fact, the fact sheet was never intended 
for them.  It is for the masses who have seen or heard the alternative theory claims and 
want balance.”67
 The problem with this line of argument, however, is that it takes the existence of a 
hard core as a given.  This is premature; we will suggest below that if the hard core arises 
for certain identifiable reasons, it can be broken up or at least muted by government 
action.  Furthermore, there are intrinsic costs to the strategy of giving up on the hard core 
and directing government efforts solely towards inoculating the mass audience. For one 
thing, the hard core may itself provide the most serious threat. For another, a response 
geared to a mass audience (whether or not nominally pitched as a response to the 
conspiracy theorists) will lead some to embrace rather than reject the conspiracy theory 
the government is trying to rebut.  This is the legitimation dilemma again: to begin a 
program of inoculation is to signal that the disease is already widespread and threatening.  
Under pluralistic ignorance, the perverse result may actually be to spread the conspiracy 
theory further. 
3. Cognitive infiltration 
Rather than taking the continued existence of the hard core as a constraint, and 
addressing itself solely to the third-party mass audience, government might undertake 
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(legal) tactics for breaking up the tight cognitive clusters of extremist theories, arguments 
and rhetoric that are produced by the hard core and reinforce it in turn.  One promising 
tactic is cognitive infiltration of extremist groups.  By this we do not mean 1960s-style 
infiltration with a view to surveillance and collecting information, possibly for use in 
future prosecutions.  Rather, we mean that government efforts might succeed in 
weakening or even breaking up the ideological and epistemological complexes that 
constitute these networks and groups. 
 How might this tactic work?  Recall that extremist networks and groups, 
including the groups that purvey conspiracy theories, typically suffer from a kind of 
crippled epistemology.  Hearing only conspiratorial accounts of government behavior, 
their members become ever more prone to believe and generate such accounts. 
Informational and reputational cascades, group polarization, and selection effects suggest 
that the generation of ever-more-extreme views within these groups can be dampened or 
reversed by the introduction of cognitive diversity.  We suggest a role for government 
efforts, and agents, in introducing such diversity.  Government agents (and their allies) 
might enter chat rooms, online social networks, or even real-space groups and attempt to 
undermine percolating conspiracy theories by raising doubts about their factual premises, 
causal logic or implications for political action. 
In one variant, government agents would openly proclaim, or at least make no 
effort to conceal, their institutional affiliations.  A recent newspaper story recounts that 
Arabic-speaking Muslim officials from the State Department have participated in 
dialogues at radical Islamist chat rooms and websites in order to ventilate arguments not 
usually heard among the groups that cluster around those sites, with some success.68  In 
another variant, government officials would participate anonymously or even with false 
identities.  Each approach has distinct costs and benefits; the second is riskier but 
potentially brings higher returns.  In the former case, where government officials 
participate openly as such, hard-core members of the relevant networks, communities and 
conspiracy-minded organizations may entirely discount what the officials say, right from 
the beginning.  The risk with tactics of anonymous participation, conversely, is that if the 
tactic becomes known, any true member of the relevant groups who raises doubts may be 
suspected of government connections.  Despite these difficulties, the two forms of 
cognitive infiltration offer different risk-reward mixes and are both potentially useful 
instruments. 
There is a similar tradeoff along another dimension: whether the infiltration 
should occur in the real world, through physical penetration of conspiracist groups by 
undercover agents, or instead should occur strictly in cyberspace.  The latter is safer, but 
potentially less productive.  The former will sometimes be indispensable, where the 
groups that purvey conspiracy theories (and perhaps themselves formulate conspiracies) 
formulate their views through real-space informational networks rather than virtual 
networks.  Infiltration of any kind poses well-known risks: perhaps agents will be asked 
to perform criminal acts to prove their bona fides, or (less plausibly) will themselves 
become persuaded by the conspiratorial views they are supposed to be undermining; 
perhaps agents will be unmasked and harmed by the infiltrated group.  But the risks are 
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generally greater for real-world infiltration, where the agent is exposed to more serious 
harms. 
All these risk-reward tradeoffs deserve careful consideration.  Particular tactics 
may or may not be cost-justified under particular circumstances.  Our main suggestion is 
just that, whatever the tactical details, there would seem to be ample reason for 
government efforts to introduce some cognitive diversity into the groups that generate 
conspiracy theories.    Social cascades are sometimes quite fragile, precisely because they 
are based on small slivers of information. Once corrective information is introduced, 
large numbers of people can be shifted to different views. If government is able to have 
credibility, or to act through credible agents, it might well be successful in dislodging 
beliefs that are held only because no one contradicts them.  Likewise, polarization tends 
to decrease when divergent views are voiced within the group.69  Introducing a measure 
of cognitive diversity can break up the epistemological networks and clusters that supply 
conspiracy theories. 
C.  A Role for Law, and Courts? 
 So far we have detailed some dilemmas facing government officials and have 
suggested some policy responses.  What if anything is the role of law, and courts, in these 
matters?  The principal point of contact between the legal system and the issues discussed 
here is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which creates a presumption of 
transparency for documents held by administrative agencies and executive institutions.  
Unless the government can show that the requested information falls within one of a 
designated list of exceptions, there is a legal right to disclosure, and the Supreme Court 
has created a broad concept of “informational standing”70 to permit interested groups and 
citizens to enforce that right. 
 FOIA becomes relevant when the government holds, and declines to disclose, 
information that might rebut a circulating conspiracy theory.  An example involves the 
disclosure of the Department of Defense video involving Flight 77’s crash into the 
Pentagon on 9/11.  A pro-transparency group, Judicial Watch, filed a FOIA request to 
obtain the video, but the Defense Department declined, saying that the video was to be 
used in the trial of Zacharias Moussaoui.  Judicial Watch filed suit to force disclosure, 
with the avowed objective of using the video to rebut the conspiracy theories surrounding 
Flight 77.  However, when the Moussaoui trial ended the government released the video 
before the lawsuit could be decided.71
 The details of the case only suggest the larger question that it poses: should 
courts, and law, force the executive to disclose information that a litigant claims would 
help to rebut conspiracy theories?  If the answer is yes, then control over the timing and 
nature of the executive’s responsive strategy will be partially transferred to litigating 
groups and judges.  If the answer is no, the executive will retain full control. 
 We suggest that the critical question is a comparative institutional one.  Will 
adding judicial involvement, itself partially determined by the decisions of litigating 
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groups, create a net improvement in the government’s overall response strategy?  In 
general, two conditions must hold for this to be so.  First, there must be some mechanism 
that causes the executive systematically to make suboptimal decisions about whether, 
when, and how to release information that might rebut conspiracy theories.  If executive 
branch decisions are unbiased, in the sense that they are accurate on average (even if 
randomly mistaken in particular cases), then courts will be hard pressed to improve upon 
them.72  Second, even if the executive branch does make predictable errors, the litigation 
process must have some relative institutional advantage in this regard; it must be able to 
improve upon the executive’s choices.  The benchmark is not optimal disclosure, but the 
disclosure that actually results from adding litigation-based oversight to executive branch 
decisions. 
 There is little reason to think, in general, that both of these conditions will usually 
be met.  In the Flight 77 case, Judicial Watch offered no concrete reason why the 
executive would erroneously balance the relative benefits and costs of disclosing the 
information immediately, including (1) the expected gain to the government’s efforts to 
rebut the Flight 77 conspiracy theories; (2) the expected costs to national security of 
disclosing details about the Department of Defense’s surveillance activities and methods; 
and (3) the lost option value of disclosing later, rather than now.  Judicial Watch noted 
that (2) was low, because most of the information was already public in one way or 
another, and this seems plausible.  However, (1) was also low.  As we have detailed 
above, the video’s release did little to squelch the Flight 77 conspiracy theorists, who 
promptly folded the video into their theories.  Factor (3) is hard to estimate; but it is clear 
that when courts require disclosure in such situations, the value of the option to make a 
later disclosure is systematically destroyed.  Even if the executive would make mistakes 
about these factors, viewed in the light of hindsight, it is plausible to think that those 
mistakes will tend to be randomly distributed, in part because governmental interests are 
on both sides of the balance.  In any event, Judicial Watch offered no reason to think that 
the litigation process would systematically do better. In general, the argument for 
compelled disclosure is strongest when the executive branch is likely to be systematically 
biased against disclosure, for self-serving reasons; this is the argument that most 
plausibly justifies FOIA itself. When a conspiracy theory is at work, there is unlikely to 
be any systematic bias against disclosure, because the executive has a strong incentive to 
correct the theory. 
 To be sure, the first of the two conditions we have mentioned – that executive 
branch disclosures are not optimally geared to suppressing conspiracy theories – does 
seem plausible under certain conditions.  Because the executive is partially a they, not an 
it,73 its (their) efforts to respond to conspiracy theories may be hampered by poor 
coordination across agencies or executive departments.  Perhaps, for example, one 
agency holds information that it refuses to disclose or even transmit within the executive 
branch, although another agency or another branch of government needs it to combat a 
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conspiracy theory.  Here there is a kind of intra-executive externality, with one agency 
failing to take into account the full costs of its actions to other institutions.  Moreover, if 
there are systematic incentives for overclassification and excessive government secrecy – 
a claim that is often heard but rarely fleshed out with concrete mechanisms – then there 
will be systematic error in government responses, with too little disclosure or disclosure 
coming too late. 
 However, these possibilities are balanced by equally speculative possibilities 
cutting in other directions.  If the executive is a they, not an it, it may also be the case that 
a given agency does not fully take into account the harms of disclosure to the mission of 
other agencies, and the problem will be too much disclosure or premature disclosure 
(from the standpoint of the latter agencies).  Intra-executive externalities and agency 
incentives may cut in either direction; their net effect is hard to assess in the abstract, and 
there is little reason to think they necessarily create a systematic skew in one direction or 
another.  Furthermore, addressing conspiracy theories is not the only thing the executive 
does.  Even if an agency is not acting optimally with respect to that goal, it may be acting 
in a way that promotes good policy (somehow defined) overall.  
 Most importantly, there is little general reason to think that the second condition – 
that litigating groups and judges can improve upon the executive’s choices – will often be 
met.  First, if agencies may hold motivations or face incentives that distort the optimal 
approach to information disclosure, courts suffer from deficits of expertise and 
policymaking ability that hamper their efforts to make things better.  Here a serious 
problem is that courts decide one case at a time.  While this practice has many benefits,74 
it makes it difficult for courts to gain a systemic view75 across an array of cases in order 
to decide whether an agencies’ decisions are systematically distorted, or to evaluate 
whether inter-executive externalities are occurring.   
Second, suppose that the court does know (better than the executive) how and 
when to disclose information in order to rebut a conspiracy theory.  The problem is that 
the court may be legally constrained not to act optimally in any event. There is no 
necessary connection between the timing of the lawsuit and the optimal timing of 
disclosure for addressing the relevant conspiracy theory.  In the Judicial Watch case, the 
optimal time of disclosure may have been never, given the low benefits; it may also have 
been at some time in the future.  The court, however, is legally constrained from acting 
on its open-ended assessment.  It may decide that the plaintiff prevails and disclosure 
occurs, or not, but in general it may not fine-tune the timing of disclosure at will. 
 In all of these remarks, we have made two assumptions that cabin the analysis; we 
are not offering a general account of FOIA litigation.  We have assumed first of all that – 
as in the Judicial Watch litigation – the plaintiff’s avowed purpose is to force a disclosure 
that in the plaintiff’s judgment will rebut a spreading conspiracy theory.  In internal legal 
terms, this is irrelevant; the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that reviewing courts 
should not consider the specific interests of the requester in obtaining FOIA disclosure.76  
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However, it is certainly relevant from an external standpoint, where the question is how 
to assess the institutional capacities of relevant actors.  Where the aim of all concerned 
actors, including the plaintiffs, is to supply an optimal response to conspiracy theories 
rather than to assert other interests, there are special grounds for doubting that the 
litigation process can improve upon executive branch choices. 
We have also assumed that the relevant statutes are sufficiently ambiguous or 
vague that both agencies and courts are at least in part making policy choices, rather than 
enforcing the law in any simple sense.  Where this is not so, and the commands of FOIA 
are clear, courts should enforce them.  If the resulting disclosure is not optimally timed, 
the problem lies with the statute (as applied).  In general, however, this is not the 
situation such cases will pose.  Rather the agency resists disclosure under a vague or 
broadly worded FOIA exemption, and perhaps also by invoking principles such as the 
“mosaic theory,”77 according to which government may resist disclosures that are 
innocuous in themselves but that can be assembled into a larger picture damaging to 
national security.  If the reviewing court does not face a clear legal command, and if the 
court lacks confidence (as we do) that the litigation process will on average produce 
better responses to conspiracy theorizing, then the court should stay its hand. 
D.  A Note on Conspiracy Theories Abroad 
 Our focus has been on domestic conspiracy theories, although some of the 
relevant considerations are constant across both domestic and foreign audiences.  
Conspiracy theories flourish in many Middle Eastern and predominantly Muslim 
countries, so much so that there is a small literature asking why Muslims are so prone to 
conspiracy theorizing.78  (One paper by Freudian psychologists even ascribes this “fact” 
to Muslim child-rearing practices79; we are skeptical.)  If many Muslims abroad are 
prone to conspiracy theorizing, so too are many non-Muslims in the United States, as the 
evidence given above demonstrates.  On the other hand, we have conjectured that there is 
a causal link between the prevalence of conspiracy theories and the relative absence of 
civil liberties and a well-functioning marketplace of ideas,80 so it is unsurprising that 
such theories are even more widespread in the Muslim world than in the United States.  
Overall, conspiracy theorizing is undoubtedly virulent in the Muslim world, has a sharply 
anti-American inflection, and poses problems that are somewhat distinctive, so a brief 
discussion is warranted. 
 On the diagnostic side, it is highly likely that the virulence of conspiracy 
theorizing in Muslim nations has a great deal to do with social cascades and group 
polarization, and with weak civil liberties and the lack of a robust market for ideas in 
many of those nations. In terms of our suggested policy responses, the foreign setting is 
both a worse and a better environment for the U.S. government.  It is worse in that the 
nature of the relevant institutions  and audiences in the Muslim world sharpens many of 
the dilemmas and tradeoffs we have described.  Typically, the audience is antecedently 
skeptical, in the extreme, of anything said by United States officials; shortly we will see 
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that this creates enormous pressure for the U.S. to engage in various forms of covert or 
anonymous speech.  The marketplace of ideas, in many Muslim nations, is institutionally 
fragile or dominated by powerful governments.  Civil liberties, including free speech, are 
often shaky.  The upside to the foreign setting, however, is that on some dimensions the 
U.S. enjoys greater freedom of action, in part because domestic U.S. politics will tolerate 
some actions abroad that it would not tolerate if taken at home.   
We begin with the difficulties.  The foreign setting sharpens one of the central 
tradeoffs we have identified: to enhance the credibility of speech that debunks conspiracy 
theories, the government must surrender some degree of control over the institutions of 
speech.  In 2004, the U.S. government set up a broadcast network for the Middle East – 
Al-Hurrah, “the Free One” – that puts out news and third-party opinion.  In May 2007, a 
House subcommittee called a hearing to investigate reports that Al-Hurrah had broadcast 
“terrorist” content, including “a 68-minute call to arms against Israelis by a senior figure 
of the terrorist group Hezbollah; [and] deferential coverage of Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denial conference . . . ”.81  Legislators sharply 
questioned officials of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the government corporation 
that ultimately funds Al-Hurrah, and those officials had to promise to address the 
legislators’ concerns.  Those problems, however, were part and parcel of a broader 
strategy for enhancing credibility by permitting other viewpoints and voices on the air.  
In general, in order to enhance its credibility with antecedently skeptical Muslim 
audiences, the U.S. government must go a long way towards surrendering control over 
the content of its speech (or must speak anonymously, a strategy that carries its own 
risks, as we mention next).  However, as this episode reveals, domestic political 
constraints may preclude whatever mix of credibility and control is optimal from the 
standpoint of dampening conspiracy theories or promoting U.S. public relations goals 
more generally. 
The alternative to surrendering control over the content of the government’s 
responses, in order to enhance credibility, is for government officials or agents to speak 
anonymously.  A mini-scandal erupted in 2006 when U.S. newspapers revealed that the 
Lincoln Group, an independent contractor of “influence services,” had paid Iraqi 
newspapers to publish hundreds of “news stories” written by U.S. military personnel but 
not identified as such, most of which portrayed events in Iraq in cheery terms or rebutted 
circulating conspiracy theories.82  The stories were factually true, but selective.  As 
against the obvious moral objections to this practice, the Lincoln Group argued that 
speech identified as stemming from U.S. sources would, even if true, credible and 
important, be utterly discounted by the Iraqi audience, leaving the field entirely to 
conspiratorial and hostile rumors.  On this view the implicit lie of planting “news” stories 
not identified to their true sources is necessary, in a deliberative environment that is 
already warped, to the goal of putting all relevant information before a quasi-rational 
audience.  Where the marketplace of ideas is already malfunctioning, in the sense that 
relevant audiences discount to zero statements that should carry positive weight, practices 
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that would not be permissible in a well-developed liberal state might be permissible on 
second-best grounds.  
A better objection to this practice may instead be tactical.  By outsourcing this 
form of quasi-propaganda to an independent contractor whose participation would sooner 
or later be brought to light, the U.S. government fell between two stools, obtaining 
neither the credibility benefits of full transparency nor the credibility benefits of totally 
anonymous speech.  Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA case officer, commented that 
“[t]he historical parallel would be the [CIA’s] efforts during the Cold War to fund 
magazines, newspapers and journalists who believed that the West should triumph over 
communism.  Much of what you do ought to be covert, and, certainly, if you contract it 
out, it isn’t.”83  
 So far we have discussed the distinctive difficulties of the foreign setting.  On 
other dimensions, however, the foreign setting loosens various legal and political 
constraints, allowing the U.S. government greater freedom in responding to conspiracy 
theories.  In 2004, the U.S. administrator for Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, ordered troops to shut 
down a weekly newspaper in Baghdad that had propounded false conspiracy theories 
damaging to the U.S., such as a story that “an American missile, not a terrorist car bomb, 
had caused an explosion that killed more than 50 Iraqi police recruits.”84  Whether this 
sort of action does more harm than good, in similar environments, is a complicated 
question, depending on difficult judgments about the etiology of conspiracy theories, the 
consequences of censorship, and the efficacy of U.S. counterspeech.  On the one hand, 
there are the familiar arguments that censorship attracts attention to the censored speech 
or publication and fuels further conspiracy theorizing; perhaps, the inference might run, 
the U.S. is moving against a particular rumor because it is true, or is moving against a 
particular paper because it is exposing actual U.S. conspiracies.  Furthermore, censorship 
might just drive the conspiracy theories underground, to be spread and mutated by 
personal rumor-mongering that is less susceptible to focused rebuttal.   
On the other hand, the peculiar environment in which Bremer acted may weigh in 
favor of a policy of censoring publication of conspiracy theories.  One editorial argued 
that “[t]he occupation authorities have plenty of means, including their own television 
station, to get out a more favorable message.”85 However, this ignores the effect 
discussed above, that the antecedent skepticism of the Iraqi audience is so strong that any 
U.S. statements, even if true, credible and important, will be ignored altogether.  With an 
audience already thoroughly in the grip of conspiracy theories, open counterspeech may 
simply be more grist for the conspiratorial mill.  Consider that when Al-Hurra began its 
operations, a conspiracy theory quickly circulated, claiming that the short-term contracts 
given to Al-Hurra personnel showed that the station was set up only to bolster George W. 
Bush’s reelection campaign, and would presumably be shut down after the election.86  
Given the extremely low efficacy of U.S. counterspeech in this sort of environment, the 
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realistic options may be limited to censorship and anonymous or quasi-anonymous 
counterspeech in the style of the Lincoln Group.  Whatever the merits of these pragmatic 
and tactical questions, the availability of censorship gives U.S. officials operating in 
foreign countries an extra instrument for coping with conspiracy theories, one that is not 
available in the domestic arena due to both legal and political constraints. 
Conclusion     
Our goal here has been to understand the sources of conspiracy theories and to 
examine potential government responses. Most people lack direct or personal information 
about the explanations for terrible events, and they are often tempted to attribute such 
events to some nefarious actor. The temptation is least likely to be resisted if others are 
making the same attributions. Conspiracy cascades arise through the same processes  that 
fuel many kinds of social errors. What makes such cascades most distinctive, and 
relevantly different from other cascades involving beliefs that are both false and harmful, 
is their self-insulating quality. The very statements and facts that might dissolve 
conspiracy  cascades can be taken as further evidence on their behalf. These points make 
it especially difficult for outsiders, including governments, to debunk them. 
Some conspiracy theories create serious risks. They do not merely undermine 
democratic debate; in extreme cases, they create or fuel violence. If government can 
dispel such theories, it should do so. One problem is that its efforts might be 
counterproductive, because efforts to rebut conspiracy theories also legitimate them. We  
have suggested, however, that government can minimize this effect by rebutting more 
rather than fewer theories, by enlisting independent groups to supply rebuttals, and by 
cognitive infiltration designed to break up the crippled epistemology of conspiracy-
minded groups and informationally isolated social networks. 
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